Constitutional Procedure for the Reform of the Supreme Court of Canada by Lederman, W. R.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Constitutional Procedure for the Reform of the Supreme Court of Canada"
 
W. R. Lederman








Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 12:46
La réforme de la 
Cour suprême 
Constitutional Procedure and the Reform 
of the Supreme Court of Canada 
W. R. LEDERMAN * 
L'auteur nous trace l'évolution de la Cour suprême du Canada créée en 
1875 ainsi que des implications pour cette Cour, de la venue de la Loi 
constitutionnelle de 1982, spécialement des articles 41(d) et 42(l)(d). Il exprime 
son point de vue quant au nombre de juges qui doivent siéger, aux quotas 
régionaux, aux méthodes de sélection. Il examine aussi la question de savoir si la 
Cour suprême doit continuer d'être le tribunal général d'appel au Canada ou si 
elle devrait se spécialiser en droit public et constitutionnel. 
During the later 1970's and the early 1980's Canadians have been 
actively debating basic constitutional change across the whole spectrum of 
our federal system and our main governmental institutions. Inevitably, in 
this debate, the Supreme Court of Canada has come in for its share of 
attention, because it is the apex of our country's judicial system. It has final 
appellate judicial power over the interpretation of the laws and the consti-
tution of Canada and the Provinces. It is true that the basic constitutional 
changes of April 17, 1982, were primarily concerned with patriation of the 
constitution by putting into effect new domestic amending procedures, and 
with the establishment of a specially entrenched « Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms ». ' There were no direct changes to the judicial system 
involved, but, nevertheless, there were important implications for the courts, 
especially for the Supreme Court of Canada, in the events of April 17, 1982. 
In the first place, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of that date has to be 
authoritatively interpreted, and the Supreme Court of Canada is the final 
tribunal of interpretation for this purpose. So the importance of what the 
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Court does has been very significantly enhanced in the country, and 
Canadians are accordingly becoming more concerned with how well and 
how effectively the Court performs its high duties in this as well as in other 
respects. 
In the second place, it may be said that the new amending procedures of 
1982 have in effect « constitutionalized » the Supreme Court of Canada itself. 
Originally, the Court was established in 1875 by an ordinary statute of the 
Parliament of Canada, as authorized by section 101 of the old British North 
America Act of 18672, which reads as follows : 
The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from 
time to time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance and Organization of a 
General Court of Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any 
additional courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada. 
Thus, changes affecting the Court could be implemented by simple 
amendments of the Supreme Court Act3, and, until April 17, 1982, that was 
indeed the way this was done from time to time over the years. On the latter 
date, however, the Supreme Court of Canada was named in the new special 
amending procedures as subject to them. Under Section 41(d) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, it is provided that any changes to « the composition 
of the Supreme Court of Canada » require the consent of the Parliament of 
Canada and the consents of all the legislatures of the ten provinces. Under 
sections 38(1) and 42(l)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982, any other basic 
changes respecting « the Supreme Court of Canada » require the consent of 
the Parliament of Canada and the consents of seven out of the ten 
legislatures of the provinces, provided the consenting seven have at least 
50% of the population of all the provinces. 
In other words, on April 17, 1982, certain essential elements of the 
Supreme Court Act of the Parliament of Canada were removed from the 
ordinary statutory process in that Parliament and were raised to superior 
constitutional status as indicated. To the extent that it is inconsistent with 
this result, the original section 101 of the B.N.A. Act of 1867 must be taken to 
have been rendered inoperative on April 17, 1982, by necessary implication. 
All the provisions of the Supreme Court Act as they stood on that date 
continue, but certain sections of it that are basic now rest upon the superior 
constitutional foundation afforded by the new and special amending pro-
cesses in the Constitution Act, 1982. 
2. British North America Act 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), now designated the Constitution 
Act, 1867. 
3. The Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. S-19. Amendments: R.S.C. (1" Supp.) c. 44; 
1974-75-76,c. 18and 19; 1976-77, c. 25, s.s. 19 and 20. This is the Act as it stood on April 17, 
1982. 
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To be more precise, what are the detailed implications of sections 41(d) 
and 42(l)(d) of the Constitution Act, 19821 To an important degree they are 
clearly inconsistent with the first part of section 101 of 1867 which deals with 
« a General Court of Appeal for Canada ». Section 52(2)(a) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 puts sections 41(d) and 42(1 )(d) in force from April 17, 1982, 
because they are part of «this Act». But also, section 52(2)(b) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 declares that section 101 of 1867 continues in force, 
with 1867 as its date of origin, because it is included in Item 1 of the Schedule 
to the Constitution Act, 1982. Thus we end up with specially entrenched 
constitutional provisions of different dates of origin that are to an important 
degree simply inconsistent with one another. There is no way restrictive 
definitions of key words can be used to eliminate the conflict altogether. To 
the extent of the inconsistency, the respective constitutional provisions of the 
two different dates cannot live and operate together. In these circumstances, 
the governing rule of interpretation to solve the issue is that, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, the later provisions (those of 1982) override and render 
inoperative the earlier provision (that of 1867).4 
In detail, I submit that the results of applying this rule of interpretation 
are as follows : 
(a) The references in sections 41(d) and 42(1 )(d) to « the Supreme Court 
of Canada» are necessarily references to essential sections of the 
Supreme Court Act of the Parliament of Canada as it stood on 
April 17, 1982. 
(b) The override rule of interpretation just given means that we must 
now characterize each of the one hundred and two sections of the 
Supreme Court Act as falling into one of three categories. 
(1) Those sections that have to do with the basic composition of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Examples are : 
Section 4. The Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice to 
be called the Chief Justice of Canada, and eight puisne judges, 
who shall be appointed by the Governor in Council by letters 
patent under the Great Seal. 
Section 6. At least three of the judges shall be appointed from 
among the judges of the Court of Appeal, or of the Superior 
Court, or the barristers or advocates of the Province of Quebec. 
4. E.A. DRIEDOER, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1983, p. 226-235. 
If it is argued that this rule applies only to ordinary statutes and not to entrenched 
constitutional provisions, I reply that the constitutional provisions in conflict here are 
formally sections in ordinary statutes of the British Parliament having different dates. 
Anyway, the rule expresses what is common sense in these circumstances. 
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Section 9. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the judges hold office 
during good behaviour, but are removable by the Governor 
General on address of the Senate and House of Commons. 
(2) A judge ceases to hold office upon attaining 
the age of seventy-five years. 
(2) Those sections that have to do with basic elements of the Court 
other than composition. Examples are : 
Section 3. The court of common law and equity in and for 
Canada now existing under the name of the Supreme Court of 
Canada is hereby continued under that name as a general court 
of appeal for Canada... 
Section 35. The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise, 
an appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within and throughout 
Canada. 
Section 54(1) The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise 
exclusive ultimate appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction within 
and for Canada ; and the judgment of the Court is, in all cases, 
final and conclusive. 
(3) Those sections which are secondary or incidental provisions of 
the Supreme Court Act, having to do with detailed administration 
or operation of the Court, given that its essential elements 
have been settled by the sections falling within categories (1) and 
(2) above. Most of the one hundred and two sections of the 
Supreme Court Act would fall within this residual category, 
according to my reasoning. Examples are : 
Section 8. The judges shall reside in the National Capital Region 
described in the schedule to the National Capital Act or within 
40 kilometres thereof. 
Section 103. (This section provides that the judges of the 
Supreme Court, or any five of them, may make general rules 
and orders regulating procedures, whereby the functions of the 
Court may be carried out. The full text of the section should be 
consulted.) 
The residual category arises because I am reading section 42(l)(d) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 in a restrained way. It says that the special amending 
process it calls for applies, «subject to paragraph 41(d)», to «the Supreme 
Court of Canada». I am construing this to mean that the special amending 
process for section 42(1 )(d) applies to « basic elements of the Supreme Court 
of Canada other than composition of the Court ». It does not make sense to 
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consider that all one hundred and two sections of the present Supreme Court 
Act of the Parliament of Canada are now specially entrenched by the joint 
operation of sections 41(d) and 42(l)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Moreover, this reading down of section 42(l)(d), if that is what it is5, has the 
effect of reducing the extent of the inconsistency between section 101 of 1867 
and section 42(l)(d) of 1982. It leaves an important area of jurisdiction still 
operative for the Parliament of Canada as a matter of ordinary statute by 
virtue of section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. But sections 41(d) and 
42(1 )(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 do have their intended effect. They 
guarantee the continued existence of the Supreme Court by special entrench-
ment of its basic elements as those elements are manifested in some of the 
sections of the Supreme Court Act of the Parliament of Canada as it stood on 
April 17, 1982. 
If I am right in my opinion that I have correctly identified the 
distinctions to be made, the question arises : Who decides these issues ? 
Under the Constitution, who assigns the respective provisions of the 
Supreme Court Act to one or other of the three categories ? The answer is the 
present Supreme Court of Canada itself makes these decisions. It has the 
final and authoritative power to interpret the specially entrenched provisions 
of the constitution that I have been discussing, whenever the matter is 
properly raised before the court ; as it could be, for example, by a reference 
to the Court by the Governor in Council under section 55 of the Supreme 
Court Act6. Unless and until this task is carried out by the judges of the 
Supreme Court themselves, the Parliament of Canada will not know the 
extent of its residual statutory power respecting the Court. I have argued 
earlier in this analysis that some such power remains for Parliament in 
secondary matters. 
This is not a new type of distinction for the Supreme Court of Canada 
to be making. In the Senate Reference Case of 19797, the Court made 
precisely this kind of distinction between basic and secondary elements of 
the Senate for purposes of determining the validity of proposed amendments 
to the nature of that institution by ordinary statute of the Parliament of 
Canada. The Court distinguished between elements of the Senate basic to 
Canada's federal union, and what it called « housekeeping» matters. 
5. It may be argued that this is not really «reading down»; that rather it is full context 
interpretation. The context comes from the history of our superior courts in general, and 
the nature of the combined statutory and special constitutional arrangements usually made 
for them. Compare provincial superior courts in Canada under section 92(14) of the 
Constitution Act 1867, as modified by sections 96 to 100 of that Act. 
6. A.G. for Ontario v. A.G. for Canada, [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.). See also LEDERMAN, 
« Amendment and Patriation», (1981) 19 Alberta L. R. 372. 
7. Reference, Re : Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54. 
200 Les Cahiers de Droit (1985) 26 C. de D. 195 
I respectfully suggest that there are other considerations that would also 
help in distinguishing the basic from the incidental concerning the Supreme 
Court as an institution. We should consult English legal history. The 
Supreme Court of Canada is pre-eminently a superior court on the English 
model — the Act of Settlement model from the Eighteenth Century — which 
is our judicial inheritance in Canada. Added to this are necessary powers and 
functions for our final court because we are a federal country, because we 
have a specially entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and because we 
adhere to the rule of law. 
Finally on this point, I do not complain about special constitutional 
status having arrived in 1982 for the Supreme Court of Canada. I welcome 
it8. In the constitutional reform discussions of the late 1970's and the early 
1980's, the one thing that was generally agreed upon about the Supreme 
Court of Canada was that it should be given superior constitutional status, 
and that it should not be even in form a statutory court. Now this change has 
been made, so that item is no longer on the reform agenda. But the other 
items on the reform agenda of the late 1970's and the early 1980's are still 
there to be dealt with. I refer to the following issues. 
(1) Should the membership of the Court be increased? Are more 
Supreme Court judges needed to keep up with the work-load of the 
Court? 
(2) Should there be regional quotas for the membership of the Court? 
Should each of the main regions of Canada be guaranteed a portion 
of the total number of judges ? 
(3) Should the methods for selecting judges to be appointed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada be reformed? 
(4) Should the Court continue to be a court of general appellate 
jurisdiction on all subjects, or should it be specialized in constitutional 
law and public law? 
8. Constitutional authorities do not all agree with my position that the Supreme Court of 
Canada has been constitutionalized. Professors Ronald Chellins and Joseph Magnet do 
agree, though they do not elaborate the analysis to the extent I have done. Professor Peter 
Hogg disagrees with me. He contends that section 101 of 1867 is still in full force and that 
the operation of sections 41(d) and 42(1 )(d) of 1982 is somehow in suspension. Dr. Barry 
Strayer (now Mr. Justice Strayer of the Federal Court) recognizes the problem but is 
non-commital about the proper solution. However, he leans to the same view as Professor 
Hogg. (At this point, I adopt the words of Sir George Jessel : <> I may be wrong, but I have 
no doubts».) 
See: CHEFFINS, (1982) 4 Supreme Court Law Review 43; MAGNET, Constitutional Law of 
Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1983, p. 39; HOGG, Canada Act 1982 Annotated, Toronto, 
Carswell, 1982, p. 92-94; STRAYER, The Canadian Constitution and The Courts, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, Butterworths, 1983, p. 32-33. 
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These issues were much discussed in the late 1970's and the early 1980's, 
and now we should return to them. However, I remind you that basic 
reforms can no longer be implemented by simple statutory amendment in the 
Parliament of Canada. A much wider federal-provincial consensus is now 
needed for change, as specified by the new amending procedures. Unanimous 
federal-provincial consent is now needed for changes respecting the size of 
the Court, regional quotas for membership, and probably for changes in the 
present methods of selection for appointment to the Court. 
Since the main purpose of my prepared comments is to lay down a 
foundation for discussion, I shall only sketch the nature of each of these 
issues and my own opinions about them, so as not to seem to foreclose 
further questions and answers. 
Concerning the size of the Court, the present full membership of the 
Court is nine judges. The minimum quorum is five, and often seven judges or 
the full nine sit. The case load of the Court is heavy, and I understand is 
showing a considerable increase at the present time. My personal opinion is 
that the Court definitely needs more judges to share the work. I would say 
that its size should be increased to eleven, or even to fifteen judges. With a 
minimum quorum of seven or nine, the fifteen judges would be better able to 
carry out the vital mission of the Court, to give judicial leadership of high 
quality to the whole country. The Court performs this function with great 
distinction now, but if it is to continue to do this in the face of an increased 
number of important appeals pressing for attention, more judges are 
needed9. 
As for regional quotas respecting membership in the Court, I consider 
them inevitable and necessary in a federal country like Canada. The 
Province of Quebec is at present guaranteed three of the nine appointments 
by the terms of the Supreme Court Act. As I explained, this provision is now 
specially entrenched and so could not be changed without the consent of 
Quebec, the consent of the other provinces of Canada, and the consent of the 
Parliament of Canada. The other quotas are customary only and are thus 
outside the formal constitution. Under them, the Atlantic Provinces usually 
have one judge, Ontario three judges and the Western Provinces two judges. 
Given the independence of each of the judges as guaranteed by their security 
of tenure in office, I do not think the regional quotas are prejudicial to the 
proper functioning of the Supreme Court of Canada. Indeed, they improve 
the Court as the final judicial tribunal for our federal country l0. 
9. See: LEDERMAN, •< Current Proposals for Reform of the Supreme Court of Canada», (1979) 
57 Can. B. R. 688. Reprinted in my collected essays: Continuing Canadian Constitutional 
Dilemmas, Toronto, Butterworths, 1981,213. 
10. See footnote 9. 
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The third issue I listed asks whether the methods of selecting persons to 
be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada should be reformed. The 
present method, specified in section 4 of the constitutionalized Supreme 
Court Act is in effect selection and appointment by the Governor in Council, 
that is, by the Federal Cabinet of the day. In fact the process whereby the 
Federal Government of the day settles on a person to be appointed to high 
judicial office, in the other high courts of the Country as well as in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, has been secretive and mysterious, at least so far 
as ordinary members of the public are concerned. Everyone would agree 
that, in the words of a recent Special Committee of the Canadian Bar 
Association on the Constitution, we should seek for the Courts generally, 
and especially for the Supreme Court of Canada, the best and most sensitive 
judicial minds the nation has to offer. But it is far from obvious how best to 
do this. 
My own view is that the process should be less secretive than it is now 
and more collégial, but that also it should be kept within the mainstream of 
the public politics of our parliamentary bodies at both the Provincial and the 
Federal levels. It may be that, if the Canadian Senate were to be reformed in 
appropriate ways, then ratification there of nominations for high judicial 
office by the Federal Government of the day might be required. This is done 
in the Senate of the United States. Or, special official nominating councils 
might be composed to recommend suitable persons for high judicial office to 
the Federal Cabinet. The federal government might be confined as a matter 
of law, or at least as a matter of usual practice, to appointing from the 
recommended list. I favour the idea of a judicial nominating council myself, 
but there are many issues about exactly how it might be composed to ensure 
that the public interest would be uppermost and bias toward the governing 
federal political party neutralized " . I emphasize that, in considering these 
issues, I am talking of systems and their implications. No disparagement of 
any Supreme Court judges past or present is intended. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has been and is now a very distinguished judicial tribunal that has 
served the country well indeed. The questions we are considering are whether 
it could be made even better and more effective by some well-calculated 
reforms to its constitution. 
Finally, there are issues whether the Supreme Court of Canada should 
continue to be the final court of general appellate jurisdiction for the country 
on all subjects, or whether it should be specialized in constitutional law and 
public law. Certainly it should continue as the final court in important 
11. See footnote 9. 
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constitutional issues concerning the federal division of legislative powers and 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Also, there are other critical 
issues concerning the rule of law itself that should reach it. However, I 
believe the Supreme Court will perform these vital functions better if it also 
remains a general appellate tribunal on most if not all other legal subjects. 
This is because the vital constitutional and rule of law issues, when they do 
occur, themselves arise in contexts that range over the entire legal system. No 
one can be perfect as a generalist in the law, but I respectfully submit that the 
Supreme Court judges are better able to perform their functions if they keep 
their hands in, so to speak, by the making of decisions which from time to 
time range over the whole of the legal and constitutional system. 
There are certain further points to be made about jurisdiction, which I 
express in words I used when writing about the matter in 1979 12. 
Moving on now from special constitutional issues, we find that there are other 
respects in which final judicial decisions with country-wide impact are essential 
or at least highly desirable. The case is obvious for such uniform and final 
interpretation of important issues arising from regular statutes of the central 
Parliament of Canada, for example the Criminal Code. At present about 
twenty-five per cent of appeals decided by the Supreme Court of Canada are 
criminal appeals. But what about provincial statutes on subjects assigned to the 
provincial legislatures, and the corresponding matters covered by the common 
law in the common law provinces and by the Civil Code in Quebec ? One of the 
purposes of a federal constitution is to continue old diversities and to permit 
new ones, province by province, in these respects. Does it not follow then that 
the several provincial courts of appeal are the proper final tribunals for issues 
arising under valid provincial laws in their respective provinces? There is 
considerable force in this proposition up to a point, but only up to a point. 
Because many transactions and relations are inter-provincial, though based on 
provincial laws, relevant precedents from a final national appellate court are at 
least in the highly beneficial category. 
Among other things, we are now touching upon problems of private inter-
national law (alternatively known as the conflict of laws). For example, 
contractis generally a provincial legislative subject, but in a private commercial 
transaction between a resident of Ontario and a resident of Quebec, is Ontario 
law to be applied or Quebec Law, where the respective provincial contract laws 
differ critically in the result they would mandate for the two parties? The rules 
of conflict of laws have been developed, mainly by the courts, to resolve these 
complex and difficult problems. Thus, in the example given, if the transaction 
is more closely connected with Quebec than Ontario, Ontario courts as well as 
Quebec courts will apply Quebec contract law, and so the results of action in 
court in either province would be the same. The converse proposition is true if 
the transaction were more closely connected with Ontario than with Quebec. 
But this beneficial reciprocity depends on a uniform definition in the conflict of 
12. See LEDERMAN, collected essays, footnote 9; Chapter 11, p. 215-217. 
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laws rules of what constitutes «closer connection» for each province. To 
ensure this uniformity, interpretation needs in the end to be in the hands of a 
final national appellate court which can issue precedents binding for all the 
provinces in this respect. 
We have just been speaking of an inter-provincial situation where the 
applicable provincial laws are different. But also there are other inter-
provincial situations where the applicable provincial laws are the same. For 
example, in the areas of company law or insurance law, the statutes of different 
provinces frequently have common provisions. There are a great many inter-
provincial relations and transactions between persons to which such uniform 
laws are relevant, and hence it is beneficial to those persons to have one 
consistent national interpretation of their meaning. In our system, the appro-
priate final appellate court for this is the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Now we may look again at the proposition stated earlier that, up to a point, it 
is logical for the provincial court of appeal to be the final court for the province 
concerned on issues arising under provincial laws. Almost invariably this 
would seem to be proper when a given case raises issues only under provincial 
laws and the determination of them would have no wider significance beyond 
the boundaries ofthat province. To a large and growing extent, this is already 
the position, because such a case is most unlikely to be accepted for appeal by 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Since 1975, in most types of cases, a litigant 
must have the consent of the Supreme Court of Canada, or that of the 
provincial Court of Appeal involved, before being permitted an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Usually this means the consent of the Supreme 
Court itself, after a brief hearing of the would-be appellant by three judges of 
the court. Unless the applicant for leave to appeal can show very quickly that 
some issue of genuine national importance is involved in his case, he is refused 
leave and the decision of the provincial Court of Appeal concerned stands as 
the final disposition of the case. So, referring to points made earlier, we find 
that leave to appeal is almost certain to be refused if (i) the issues in the case 
arise under the provincial law only, (ii) there is no basic constitutional question 
about the original validity of that law, and (iii) there are no inter-provincial 
dimensions to the case in terms either of private international law or 
uniformity with the provincial laws of other provinces. 
This concludes my comprehensive overview of principal issues concern-
ing reform of the Supreme Court of Canada. The purpose has been to 
provide a background for discussion. Of course there is much more to be 
said, but space and time do not permit that in this paper. 
